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PATENT TYING, PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
AND INNOVATION
CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE*
Patent law is the cornerstone of American innovation policy. The relationship between patents and innovation, however, is more complicated than the
simple explanation that patents reward innovators. Patent holders sometimes
engage in conduct that can reduce innovation. This article examines one type
of such conduct: tying arrangements. Patentees sometimes employ tying arrangements as a metering device to effect price discrimination. While some
commentators would justify patent tying as pro-innovation because it increases the rewards to the patentee, in this article I argue that metered tying
can diminish incentives to innovate and, consequently, antitrust law should
not recognize a price discrimination defense to patent tying.
Patent law encourages innovation by granting exclusionary rights to patent
holders.1 Patentees are able to prevent competitors from manufacturing and
selling infringing products. Absent these exclusionary rights, rival firms could
copy inventions and sell them at a lower price because they would not have to
recoup the research money invested by the actual innovator.2 A truly free market without patent protection would result in an underinvestment in research
and less innovation.3 Armed with the ability to exclude infringing competitors
* Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. The author thanks the
organizers and participants at the Stanford/ABA Conference on Antitrust and Innovation (May
19–21, 2010), as well as the editors of the Antitrust Law Journal, especially Rosie Lipscomb, for
their excellent editing. Tony Reese provided useful comments on an earlier draft. Christina Tsou
provided excellent research assistance.
1 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The patent laws . . . offer[ ] a
right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous
costs in terms of time, research, and development. The productive effort thereby fostered will
have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of
manufacture into the economy . . . .”).
2 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1467 (2002).
3 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 216 (2008) (“In economic theory,
patents can play a critical role by providing incentives for inventors to invest in R&D and other
innovative effort. Markets alone do not necessarily provide a socially optimal level of incentives
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from the market, however, the inventor with a valuable patent is able to
charge a supracompetitive price in order to recoup its investment and earn a
profit as a reward for its innovation.4 Thus, exclusionary rights provide the
basis for the monetary incentive for inventors to innovate5 and to commercialize and license their ideas.6 All of this increases innovation because if inventors cannot recoup and profit from their investments in research and
development, then innovators will shift their attention and assets elsewhere.
While these exclusionary rights increase innovation, they also impose inefficiency on the marketplace. Like any firm with sufficient market power, the
patentee with a valuable patent maximizes its profits by increasing price while
decreasing output. Consumers who would pay the competitive price for the
patented product, but not the supracompetitive price charged by the patentee,
are excluded from the market. This creates inefficiency in the form of deadweight loss. Sales that should occur in an efficient market—because the consumers value the good more than it costs to make it—do not occur. Rival
firms cannot supply this unmet demand because doing so would constitute
infringement. As a result, one residual effect of our patent system is
inefficiency.
This deadweight loss is seen as a reasonable cost for the innovation that
patent policy encourages. Because the deadweight loss is in the short term and
the increased innovation is in the long term, scholars argue that the dynamic
efficiency associated with the patent system outweighs the static inefficiency.7
Even if this inefficiency is acceptable on balance, reducing the amount of
deadweight loss associated with the patent system is nonetheless desirable.
The patent system addresses this, in part, by limiting patent scope and
duration.8
Scholars have advanced many proposals to eliminate the deadweight loss
attendant to the patent system. Some scholars advocate replacing the traditional patent regime with a reward system in which inventions enter the public
domain immediately and successful inventors earn cash prizes for their cre(Arrow 1962), and so patents are seen as an important policy instrument to remedy this market
failure.”).
4 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 761 (2009).
5 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE
IT 37 (2009) (“There is virtually unanimous agreement that the purpose of the patent system is to
promote innovation by granting exclusive rights to encourage invention.”).
6 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 76.
7 Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L . REV. 115, 129 (2003).
8 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, IP
AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
§ 1.2, at 1–10 (2d ed. 2009).
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ations.9 Patent prizes that leave the market forces in place are seen as a way to
encourage invention while avoiding deadweight loss.10 Other proposals target
particular subsets of patented products. For example, Doug Lichtman has argued that the government should subsidize purchases of patented
pharmaceuticals for consumers who value the good more than its marginal
cost but cannot pay the supracompetitive price charged by the patent holder.11
Other scholars advocate greater enforcement of rules that those patented inventions whose research was federally funded be sold at reasonable prices.12
One approach to minimizing deadweight loss is price discrimination by patentees.13 Through price discrimination, the shrewd seller attempts to discern
the individual reservation price—the highest price that a buyer is willing to
pay—for each consumer. If the seller can successfully charge a different price
to each customer—equal to that customer’s reservation price—the seller has
engaged in perfect price discrimination. Because price discrimination allows
the seller to charge a high price to high-value consumers and a low price to
low-value consumers, a monopolist that price discriminates perfectly can expand output and produce the same quantity as a competitive market.14 Thus, if
a patentee can perfectly price discriminate, this can eliminate the deadweight
loss associated with the pricing of patented goods.15

9 F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 697, 705–06 (2001) (discussing Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards
versus Intellectual Property Rights (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6956
(1999)); Michael Kremer, Patent Buy-Outs: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 6304 (1997)). Different scholars propose varying
means of valuing inventions. See id. at 706–07.
10 See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 39 (2004) (“The advantage of
prizes over patents is that they can avoid the deadweight loss of proprietary pricing.”);
Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 235 (“Proponents of patent prizes have sought to avoid the deadweight losses associated with intellectual property protection by recommending that a centralized
governmental spending program replace a market-based incentive.”); but see Kieff, supra note 9
(arguing that a patent-prize system may provide insufficient incentive for inventors to commercialize their inventions).
11 Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the
Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124–25 (1997).
12 See generally Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug
Price Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed
upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV.
631 (2001).
13 SCOTCHMER, supra note 10, at 37 (“Deadweight loss is the main defect of intellectual property as an incentive mechanism. However, there is an important caveat to this argument, namely,
price discrimination. The deadweight loss imposed by a monopolist can be mitigated, and possibly eliminated, if the monopolist can discriminate on price.”).
14 J. Gregory Sidak, Rethinking Antitrust Damages, 33 STAN. L. REV. 329, 334 (1981); see
also Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3
CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 63 (2002).
15 Kieff, supra note 9, at 727.
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Sellers can attempt price discrimination in a variety of ways. For example,
instead of differentiating individual reservation prices, sellers may charge different prices to different categories of consumers.16 Some firms charge different prices in different countries or regions.17 Others may charge their
government customers one price and private buyers another. Examples of
price discrimination strategies involving copyrighted works include selling
expensive hardcover versions of a book months before releasing a cheaper
paperback version.
One way for patent holders to price discriminate is to use metered tying. A
tying arrangement exists when a patentee refuses to sell its patented product—
or license its patent—unless the buyer or licensee agrees to purchase a second
product from the patentee. The patented product is the tying product and the
second product (whose purchase is compelled) is the tied product. In a metered tying situation, the tied product is a complementary product that is consumed as the patented tying product is used. For example, suppose that a
seller of patented copying machines has two potential customers, a law firm
willing to pay $2000 and a real estate office willing to pay $1000. Metered
tying is based on the premise that those consumers with higher reservation
prices are likely to be the higher-intensity users.18 The seller charges a
supracompetitive price for the tied product—the ink or paper used in the copier—and the subsequent purchases of the tied product measure the intensity of
use of the tying product. Because the tied product is supracompetitively
priced, high-volume users are effectively charged a higher price for the tying
product.19
16 See Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraints and Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust,
87 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1877 (2003) (“In markets protected by IP, sellers often segment their
buyers based on line of business, location, field of technology, or whether the use is not-forprofit.”).
17 See Sykes, supra note 14, at 64 (discussing price discrimination by pharmaceutical
companies).
18 Meurer, supra note 16, at 1889 (“Buyers who use a product more frequently are likely to
have a higher valuation and be willing to pay more.”).
19 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 199–200 (2d ed. 2001); M.L. Burstein, A Theory of
Full-Line Forcing, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 64–65 (1960) (“Thus, punch cards have been tied to
computers, steel strapping to applicating machines, cans to can-closing machinery, repair parts to
automobiles, staples to stapling machines, toilet paper to dispensers, mimeograph supplies to
mimeograph machines, rivets to riveting machines, etc. We see that the tied good in these cases
serves very much as a counting or metering device; the tying arrangement results in streams of
payments flowing from the users of the machine to its seller (or lessor) with the rates of flow
being directly proportional to the intensity of use of the machine. Those using the machine more
intensively are paying more; price discrimination is being achieved.”); Henry N. Butler, W.J.
Lane & Owen R. Phillips, The Futility of Antitrust Attacks on Tie-In Sales: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 173, 190 (1984); see also Robert S. Hansen & R. Blaine
Roberts, Metered Tying Arrangements, Allocative Efficiency and Price Discrimination, 47 S.
ECON. J. 73 (1980); Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J.
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Metered tying, however, raises two potential legal problems. First, tying
arrangements may constitute patent misuse. This provides a defense against
infringement charges until the misuse is purged.20 Second, tying may violate
antitrust laws. This provides an affirmative cause of action against the
patentee.
Antitrust’s condemnation of tying arrangements arose in the context of patent tying. In Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,21 the seller of a patented mimeograph
imposed a contract term that its machine “may be used only with the stencil,
paper, ink and other supplies made by A.B. Dick Co.”22 The Court held that
use of a competitor’s ink constituted infringement of the patented machine,
despite the fact that the ink was unpatented.23 Two years later, Congress repudiated A.B. Dick with the enactment of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which
condemns tying arrangements whose effect “may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.”24 Soon
thereafter, the Court in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co.25 noted that, because of the congressional enactment, A.B. Dick “must be
regarded as overruled.”26 The following year, the Court held that tying arrangements could also violate the Sherman Act.27
Antitrust’s rule against tying is based on leverage theory, which was first
articulated by the Supreme Court in Chief Justice White’s dissent in A.B.
Dick.28 Leverage theory argues that a monopolist in the tying product market
will employ a tie-in to expand its monopoly power into the tied product market.29 After the passage of the Clayton Act, leverage theory gained traction.
The Kodak majority noted that “[t]he Court has held many times that power
gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright,
599, 604–05 (2003) (“If buyers that use a machine more intensively generally have higher consumer surpluses on the package than buyers that use a machine less intensively, then an
aftermarket pricing upcharge is a way to charge higher package prices to relatively high-value
buyers while charging lower overall prices to relatively low-value buyers.”).
20 See Minebea Co., Ltd. v. Papst, 444 F. Supp. 2d 68, 209 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Patent misuse is
an equitable defense against patent infringement; it renders the patent unenforceable until the
misuse is cured and thus provides a temporary defense.”).
21 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
22 Id. at 25–26.
23 Id.
24 15 U.S.C. § 14.
25 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
26 Id. at 518.
27 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
28 White condemned the patentee’s tying requirement as an “attempt to increase the scope of
the monopoly granted by a patent . . . which tend[s] to increase monopoly and to burden the
public in the exercise of their common rights.” 224 U.S. at 70 (White, J., dissenting).
29 Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam’s Razor: A Simple Explanation of Tying Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REV. 727, 732 (2004) [hereinafter Tying
Arrangements].
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or business acumen can give rise to liability if a seller exploits his dominant
position in one market to expand his empire into the next.”30 Even if the original monopoly in the tying product market is legal, leverage theory argues that
using that monopoly to restrain competition in the market for the tied product
violates the antitrust laws.31
Scholars, particularly those associated with the Chicago School, responded
that firms do not engage in tying in order to monopolize the tied product
market. Rather, firms may impose tie-ins for other reasons, such as price discrimination. Scholars view many of the tying arrangements involving patented
products discussed in the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence as examples of price discrimination through metering, including A.B. Dick,32 Motion

30 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992) (quoting
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)); see also Image Tech.
Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] monopolist who
acquires a dominant position in one market through patents and copyrights may violate § 2 if the
monopolist exploits that dominant position to enhance a monopoly in another market.”).
31 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (“Any effort to enlarge
the scope of the patent monopoly by using the market power it confers to restrain competition in
the market for a second product will undermine competition on the merits in that second market.
Thus, the sale or lease of a patented item on condition that the buyer make all his purchases of a
separate tied product from the patentee is unlawful.”).
32 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912); see Richard A. Posner, Transaction Costs and
Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 325, 330 (2005) (“Requiring licensees to buy the ink from Dick enabled Dick to vary the
effective price the licensees paid for the machine according to the licensees’ elasticity of demand, as proxied by the amount of ink they consumed.”); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLES AND EXECUTION 262 (2005) (“Many patent ties are in fact price
discrimination devices, and when used for this purpose most are competitively benign. For example, by tying ink to its mimeograph machine A. B. Dick took advantage of the fact that highintensity users valued the machine more highly than low-intensity users. A.B. Dick then put a
substantial portion of its markup in the ink rather than the machine and was able to obtain
differential returns from users based on the volume of ink they consumed.”).
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Picture Patents,33 IBM,34 Kodak,35 and Illinois Tool Works,36 among others.37
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the possibility of using tying
arrangements to effect price discrimination.38
Some commentators and judges have suggested that the price discrimination explanation for tying arrangements should provide a defense when patent
holders are accused of violating antitrust laws by imposing a metering tie-in.
Because tying arrangements represent a form of price discrimination, the argument goes, antitrust should not condemn patent tying. The thrust of this
argument is that price discrimination by patentees facilitates innovation and
efficiency.

33 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); see Meurer, supra
note 16, at 1891 n.112 (“The same type of price discrimination was practiced in Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Movie projectors were tied to film, and
the patent owner derived most of its profit from the sale of film.”).
34 IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); see Meurer, supra note 16, at 1891
(describing IBM as a “classic illustration of contractual tying and price discrimination”); Dennis
W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market
Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194, 195 (2002) (Price discrimination through
metered tying “is the standard interpretation for why IBM required consumers of its machines to
also purchase cards from IBM.”).
35 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); see Klein & Wiley,
supra note 19, at 601–02 (describing the “aftermarket metering used by Kodak” as one of “many
[ ] examples of economic price discrimination”).
36 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); see Joshua D. Wright,
Missed Opportunities in Independent Ink, 2005–06 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 333, 335 (“Independent
Ink involves a classic example of a metering tie.”).
37 Warren S. Grimes & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink,
Inc.: Requirements Tie-Ins and Intellectual Property, 13 SW. J.L. & TRADE AMERICAS 335, 344
(2007) (noting that Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); IBM Corp. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe Mach. Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922); and
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), may have involved
potential metering). However, the Supreme Court recognized in Illinois Tool Works that International Salt probably did not represent an instance of metering: “[T]he requirements tie in that
case did not involve any price discrimination between large volume and small volume purchasers
or evidence of noncompetitive pricing. Instead, the leases at issue provided that if any competitor
offered salt, the tied product, at a lower price, ‘the lessee should be free to buy in the open
market, unless appellant would furnish the salt at an equal price.’” Illinois Tool Works, 547 U.S.
at 44 (quoting International Salt, 332 U.S. at 396).
38 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 n.30 (1984) (“In fact, in some
situations the functional link between the two items may enable the seller to maximize its monopoly return on the tying item as a means of charging a higher rent or purchase price to a larger
user of the tying item.”); id. at 36 n.4 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Tying
may also help the seller engage in price discrimination by ‘metering’ the buyer’s use of the tying
product.”); Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1349 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Where the
quantity of sales of the tied product operates as a measure of the buyer’s intensity of use of the
tying product, the seller may exact a premium from the more intensive users by charging
supracompetitive prices for the tied product.”).
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This article deals with the argument that price discrimination through patent
tying encourages innovation.39 In particular, it reviews the innovation arguments made in favor of patent tying; critiques these arguments by explaining
how metered tying is not necessarily an appropriate mechanism for rewarding
and funding research efforts; explains how patent tying can reduce the incentives for innovation in the tied product market; and discusses how antitrust
law should treat patent tying in light of the impact that such tying may have
on incentives to innovate.

I. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AS A DEFENSE TO
PATENT TYING CLAIMS
The price discrimination theory of tying arrangements is both descriptive
and prescriptive. Those who advance this theory argue that tie-ins are best
understood as a mechanism to price discriminate, not to leverage market
power across markets. The theory then shifts from explaining tie-ins to exonerating them. Because price discrimination is seen as efficient, and because
tying cannot injure competition according to these theorists,40 antitrust law
should not condemn tie-ins.41 In the context of patent tying, these theorists
make an additional innovation defense of tying. This Part presents that
argument.

A. PATENT TYING

AND

INNOVATION

Advocates of patent tying argue that patentees should be able to tie because
it facilitates price discrimination,42 which increases profits and returns to inventors and thus encourages innovation. Ward Bowman is generally credited
with developing the argument that, to the extent that price discrimination increases the innovator’s reward, patentees should be permitted to employ metered tying because it increases the incentive to innovate.43 Under this view,
patent tying is justified even if it restrains competition because “it may in39 I address the efficiency arguments in a separate article. See Christopher R. Leslie, Metered
Tying, Price Discrimination and Efficiency (forthcoming) [hereinafter Metered Tying] (critiquing
the argument that metered tying necessarily expands output of the tying product).
40 ROBERT BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX 367 (1978).
41 While some commentators see price discrimination as a reason to exonerate tying arrangements, other scholars view price discrimination as a reason to condemn tying arrangements. See
Grimes & Sullivan, supra note 37, at 342–54.
42 When I use the term “patent tying” in this article, I am referring to metered tying by a
patentee, not one-to-one bundling.
43 WARD BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 112 (1973); see Louis Kaplow, The
Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1874 (1984) (discussing
Bowman’s theory); Meurer, supra note 16, at 1875 (2003) (citing BOWMAN, supra, at 64);
Grimes & Sullivan, supra note 37, at 351 (“Proponents of maximum exploitation of IP rights
argue that the increased revenues achieved through tying a patented product to an unpatented
product provide a desirable increased incentive for innovation.”).
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crease the licensor’s reward and thereby enhance the incentive for
innovation.”44
Picking up Bowman’s mantle, Benjamin Klein and John Shepard Wiley, Jr.
argue that “price discrimination, because it efficiently encourages increased
investments in innovation, is efficiency-enhancing.”45 In addition to rewarding
traditional investments in innovation, Joshua Wright argues that metered tying
also provides incentives for “other competitive investments such as increasing
product variety, expanding retail outlets, or research and development.”46
Sometimes accompanying these innovation arguments is a species of fairness
argument that it is permissible for the patentee to extract this greater reward
through metered tying because it reflects the social value of the invention.47 If
patentees cannot realize all of the social gains created by their inventions, the
argument goes, then innovators may underinvest in research.48 Indeed, some
commentators have gone so far as to argue that price discrimination is necessary to create the proper level of rewards for inventors.49
More recently, the arguments in Illinois Tool Works invoked the innovation-based defense of tying arrangements. Although the Supreme Court was
deciding the limited issue of whether tying sellers should be presumed to possess market power when their tying product is patented, many of the arguments made against the presumption were actually calls for greater deference
to patent tying more broadly, in the name of rewarding innovation. Some advocates tried to draw a link between the presumption and innovation. For
example, the petitioner, Illinois Tool Works, argued that “[t]he presumption
thus unjustifiably increases the costs of owning, disseminating and enforcing
intellectual property through efficient contractual arrangements. These increased costs ultimately discourage firms from investing in the development

JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 7.06 (2005).
Klein & Wiley, supra note 19, at 618; see also Meurer, supra note 16, at 1881 (“It is
possible that patent law’s greater solicitude for price discrimination is explained by the perception that the extra profit from price discrimination is especially valuable as an incentive to
invent (specifically to invent pharmaceuticals, an industry that practices extensive price
discrimination).”).
46 Wright, supra note 36, at 350.
47 See Brian T. Grill, The Treatment of Metering in Antitrust Law: The Supreme Court’s Apparent Abolition of the Per Se Rule Against Metering in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent
Ink, Inc., 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1465, 1485 (2006) (“Thus, metering is desirable because it allows
manufacturers to recover more of the social value of their inventions and leads to more invention
and innovation, which in turn is likely to benefit consumers and society as a whole.”).
48 Id. at 1485.
49 Klein & Wiley, supra note 19, at 617 (arguing that “innovation would not occur at all in
competitive high-technology industries without price discrimination”) (citing William J. Baumol
& Daniel G. Swanson, The New Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination:
Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 661 (2003)).
44
45
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of intellectual property in the first place.”50 Amici, such as the ABA, agreed
and claimed that “the market power presumption . . . unjustifiably reduces
incentives to innovate.”51 Similarly, the Intellectual Property Law Association
of Chicago asserted that “the antitrust presumption against patent owners who
commercialize their inventions is effectively a penalty or disincentive to innovate or patent an innovation.”52
Other amici went further and suggested that any antitrust restrictions on
patent tying weaken innovation. For example, in its amicus brief, the New
York Intellectual Property Law Association argued that Congress enacted
Section 271(d)(5) of the Patent Code specifically to repudiate the Supreme
Court anti-tying decisions, which, according to the NYIPLA, had
“threaten[ed] the incentive to innovate” by making it harder for patentees to
impose tie-ins.53 Similarly, the United States as amicus defended patent tying
because “[r]educing the patentee’s options for efficient exploitation of its patent rights may . . . adversely impact the incentives to innovate.”54 These legal
advocates suggested that because metered tying increases the rewards to innovators, patentees should be able to impose tying arrangements on buyers and
licensees.
Metered tying by patentees does not merely reward past innovation, according to price discrimination theorists, it funds future innovation. The transfer of
wealth from consumers to producers inherent in price discrimination is rationalized as allowing the producers to recoup more of the value that they have
created in order to reinvest it into future research efforts. For example, Klein
and Wiley argue that “price discrimination allows producers to recoup more
50 Brief for the Petitioners, Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006)
(No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 1864122, at *33 (Aug. 4, 2005); see id. at 33–34 (“Given intellectual
property’s increasingly important role in our economy, such a disincentive could cause substantial long-run harm to our economy—to innovators, manufacturers and consumers alike.”).
51 Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Illinois
Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 1864121, at
*3 (Aug. 4, 2005); see also id. at 8 (“Because such presumptions are arbitrary, ignoring real
world facts, they have no proper basis from the point of view of either intellectual property or
antitrust law, and they lower incentives created by intellectual property law to invest in new jobs
and new industrial facilities based on technical advances.”); see also Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S.
28 (2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 1864093, at *28 (Aug. 4, 2005) (“a market power presumption that undermines perceived rewards may constitute a drag on innovation”).
52 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago in Support of
Petitioners, Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329),
2005 WL 1801032, at *11 (Aug. 4, 2005).
53 Brief of New York Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329),
2005 WL 1865481, at *19 (Aug. 4, 2005).
54 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Illinois Tool Works v.
Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 1864093, at *29.
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of the social value of their innovations and thereby leads to more innovation.”55 Further, they argue that through this innovation incentive, price discrimination—which is conventionally thought to deplete consumer surplus—
benefits consumers because “any increased profit from price discrimination is
passed on to consumers in the form of additional investments along whatever
dimensions give the firm the ability to price above marginal cost and price
discriminate.”56 They suggest that tying sellers will devote the additional
funds they secure through price discrimination to research product improvements, as well as to other activities, such as broadening their range of products and their number of retail outlets.57 To the extent that consumers benefit
from the investment in research and the resulting new products, this line of
argument proposes that the buying public is a beneficiary of metered tying by
patentees.
In sum, this school of thought argues that metered tying is justified as an
efficient mechanism to price discriminate, to reward and fund innovators, and,
consequently, to encourage innovation.58

B. PATENT TYING

AS A

LEGITIMATE USE

OF

PATENTS

Those who favor patent tying as a means of price discrimination argue that
metered tying represents a legitimate use of the patent. There is no general
prohibition against patentees engaging in price discrimination. For example,
price discrimination does not constitute patent misuse.59 But the question remains whether the patentee should have a right to use tying arrangements to
effect price discrimination. Judge Posner famously answered in the affirmative when he opined:
[T]here is nothing wrong with trying to make as much money as you can
from a patent. True, a tie-in can be a method of price discrimination. It
enables the patent owner to vary the amount he charges for the use of the
patent by the intensity of each user’s demand for the patent (e.g., the mimeograph), as measured by the user’s consumption of the tied product (e.g., the
ink). But since . . . there is no principle that patent owners may not engage in
price discrimination, it is unclear why one form of discrimination, the tie-in,
alone is forbidden.60
Klein & Wiley, supra note 19, at 619.
Id. at 616–17.
57 Id.
58 Grill, supra note 47, at 1485–86.
59 See Kara Moorcroft, Scofflaw Science: Avoiding the Anticommons Through Ignorance, 7
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 71, 83 (2005) (“a patent holder is not liable for patent misuse for
engaging in price discrimination”) (citing USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510–11
(7th Cir. 1982)).
60 USM Corp., 694 F.2d at 511 (Posner, J.) (citing Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v.
Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 296 (6th Cir. 1896); GEORGE STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE
210–11 (3d ed. 1966); BOWMAN, supra note 43, at 55, 116–19.
55
56
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Posner’s lament embraced the thinking of Chicago School standard-bearer
Ward Bowman, whom Posner cited. To justify why antitrust law should not
condemn patent tying, Bowman drew a distinction between patentee conduct
that maximized profits and conduct that expanded any monopoly power associated with the patent.61 For Bowman, when evaluating the intersection of
antitrust law and patent rights, “the most pertinent question involves whether
patentee-licensee agreements are profit-maximizing or are monopoly-extending.”62 Conduct in the former category represented a legitimate use of the
patent while conduct in the latter could be proscribed. The question then becomes which side of this line tying arrangements fall on. The founding fathers
of the Chicago School, Aaron Director and Edward Levi, believed that price
discrimination “might be considered more an enjoyment of the original power
than an extension of it.”63 To the extent that metered tying was simply a variant of price discrimination, the Chicago School theorists advocated antitrust
deference toward tying arrangements.
The two arguments noted in Parts I.A. and I.B. reinforce each other to form
a school of thought that advocates the legality of patent tying. First, to the
extent that the patent system is designed to create incentives to innovate, patent tying should be legal because it rewards, funds, and facilitates research.
Second, if tying is within the scope of patent rights, then antitrust law should
defer to patent law. Part II challenges these arguments and their conclusion by
critiquing the premises and analyzing the implications of the price discrimination defense to patent tying.
61 See Ward Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 19
(1957) (“A distinction can usefully be made between leverage as a revenue-maximizing device
and leverage as a monopoly-creating device. The first involves the use of existing power. The
second requires the addition of new power.”).
Louis Kaplow has explained this distinction as an illustration of the tension between static and
dynamic analysis in antitrust:
Profit-maximizing practices are meant to refer roughly to those actions that can have
fairly direct and immediate effects, while monopoly extension refers to behavior designed to have implications on the magnitude of profits and welfare loss in the future.
The prototypical example of a profit maximization device is a pricing decision by a
firm with market power, a decision which can be implemented rather quickly. By
contrast, practices designed to affect the market share and elasticity of market demand
might be labelled monopoly extension devices. These practices do not increase shortrun profits, and might even decrease them. The firm’s motivation is to change the
structural conditions it faces in the future in order that it may receive greater profits in
the future. This perspective is not static, in the sense that it does not take the existing
parameters as given; rather it is dynamic, in that it focuses upon how the parameters
change over time.
Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 524
(1985). Bowman’s analysis focused more on the static efficiency associated with price
discrimination.
62 BOWMAN, supra note 43, at 54.
63 Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L.
REV. 281, 290 (1956).
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II. CHALLENGING THE INNOVATION DEFENSE TO
PATENT TYING
While conventional wisdom suggests that patent tying facilitates innovation, the case for metered tying may be overstated because it fails to consider
the potential negative effects of patent tying. In particular, metered tying allows patentees to obtain supracompetitive profits not just for the patented
products themselves but also for complementary products that are outside the
scope of the patent. Increasing monopoly profits can lead to rent-seeking behavior, such as inefficiently duplicative expenditures in research and development that decrease social welfare.

A. REEXAMINING

THE

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATENT TYING
INNOVATION

AND

According to the theory discussed in Part I, the relationship between patentee profits and innovation incentives is deceptively simple. The questions remain whether the additional profits associated with price discrimination are
necessary to spur research and whether tying is an appropriate mechanism to
achieve this price discrimination.
1. The Patentee’s Reward
Advocates of patent tying argue that the practice is justified because it rewards innovators. But even without engaging in tying, patentees already receive a substantial reward: the ability to charge higher prices for the patented
product. A patent confers the right to exclude competitors from making infringing products which, in the absence of non-infringing substitutes, permits
the patentee to charge a supracompetitive price. It is per se legal for any monopolist to unilaterally increase the price of its product.64 This is particularly
true for monopolies acquired through patents because the prospect of monopoly pricing provides the incentive to invent and patent in the first place.65
With its exclusionary rights in hand, the patentee is able to charge whatever
the market will bear. Of course, most patents do not confer monopoly power
either because of the availability of non-infringing substitutes or low consumer demand for the patented product. This, however, is arguably a virtue of
the patent system because patentees are rewarded in measure with the value
that they have created. As Alan Sykes has explained:
64 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 (2009) (“Simply
possessing monopoly power and charging monopoly prices does not violate § 2 . . . .”).
65 See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981) (“No court has ever
held that the antitrust laws require a patent holder to forfeit the exclusionary power inherent in
his patent the instant his patent monopoly affords him monopoly power over a relevant product
market.”).
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The magnitude of the rents to inventors under a patent system is reasonably
correlated with the value of an invention—monopoly rents will be greater
the lesser the extent to which close substitutes for the patented good exist,
and the greater the degree to which consumers value it in excess of its cost.66

Patentees may argue that they should be able to capture the full value of their
invention by using metered tying to extract the entire consumer surplus associated with their invention. But, while price discrimination achieved directly
by charging different prices for the patented product to different consumers
may be permissible, metered tying allows the patentee to secure its rewards
from an unpatented product.
A patent allows the patentee to exclude competitors in order to increase the
price of the patented product. Depending on the nature of the non-infringing
substitutes, the patentee may legally charge a monopoly price for the patented
product, but that does not entail any corresponding right to charge supracompetitive prices for other products. In patent cases, the Supreme Court early on
expressed its concern that a patentee could use a tie-in to “derive its profit, not
from the invention on which the law gives it a monopoly, but from the unpatented supplies with which it is used is wholly without the scope of the patent
monopoly.”67 The Court has specifically rejected the argument that the
supracompetitive price in the tied product market is justified by the reduced
price in the patented tying product market. In the Motion Picture Patents case,
the Court explained:
It is argued as a merit of this system of sale under a license notice that the
public is benefitted by the sale of the machine at what is practically its cost,
and by the fact that the owner of the patent makes its entire profit from the
sale of the supplies with which it is operated. This fact, if it be a fact, instead
of commending, is the clearest possible condemnation of the practice
adopted, for it proves that under color of its patent, the owner intends to and
does derive its profit, not from the invention on which the law gives it a
monopoly, but from the unpatented supplies with which it is used, and which
are wholly without the scope of the patent monopoly, thus in effect extending the power to the owner of the patent to fix the price to the public of
the unpatented supplies as effectively as he may fix the price on the patented
machine.68

Having invented a desirable product, the patent holder is entitled to raise the
price of this product while preventing its rivals from selling an infringing
product. In sum, the patentee’s reward is the ability to raise prices for the
Sykes, supra note 14, at 57.
Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1931) (quoting
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917)).
68 Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 516–17; see also United States v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
272 U.S. 476, 493 (1926) (“The price at which a patented article sells is certainly a circumstance
having a more direct relation and is more germane to the rights of the patentee than the unpatented material with which the patented article may be used.”).
66
67

2011] PATENT TYING, PRICE DISCRIMINATION,

AND

INNOVATION

825

patented product, not the power to extract higher prices from locked-in sales
of other products.
2. Calibrating the Optimal Reward
Given that patents confer exclusionary rights that permit patentees to
charge a supracompetitive price while blocking infringing sales, it is fair to
ask why patentees should be afforded the supplemental right to impose tying
requirements on licensees and buyers. Proponents of metered tying would respond that tying increases the profits of patentees and thus creates additional
incentives to innovate. This raises a series of questions about the need for the
additional inducement to innovate. For example, where is the evidence that
the ability to exclude rivals and charge a supracompetitive price for the patented product is insufficient incentive to engage in the socially optimal level
of research and development?
It is important to remember that we are talking about a particular subset of
patentees—patentees with valuable patents that confer sufficient market
power to impose tying requirements on their customers. Indeed, we are talking about a subset within this subset because not all holders of valuable patents impose tying requirements. In fact, most do not. For example, valuable
patents that are not used with a complementary consumable product do not
lend themselves to price discrimination through metered tying.
Consequently, the patent reward system does not depend on metered tying;
indeed, metered tying constituted patent misuse for most of the 20th century,
and yet the patent reward system seemed to function well to spur innovation.
Where is the evidence that those patented products used to facilitate tying
arrangements are the patents that need a greater return in order to recoup the
initial investment in research and development?
One problem inherent in any patent system is the difficulty in calibrating
the optimal reward. Proponents of relaxing antitrust scrutiny of patent tying
must believe that the current reward absent tying is suboptimal. To prove this,
one would need to show that firms that engage in metered tying innovate
more than comparable firms that do not. Such evidence does not exist.
Ward Bowman published his price discrimination defense of tying over a
half-century ago. Plenty of time has passed for the supporters of metered tying
to develop and present evidence to prove Bowman’s theory that metered tying
creates incentives to innovate. Yet, as one commentator has noted, “Nothing
suggests that all or most inventors rely on the ability to exact returns from a
tied market when deciding to innovate. In its purest form, nothing in the incentive theory justification for patent law contemplates allowing inventors to
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exploit the grants from a patent in a wholly separate, tied market.”69 Given the
great influence of Bowman’s work in this area, the absence of empirical evidence to prove the theory is striking.
A more permissive attitude toward patent tying “‘reflects good policy if the
tie can be justified as an ex ante incentive to innovation which would not
otherwise occur.’”70 In the absence of such proof, permitting patent tying
“‘would reflect an ill-advised extension of property rights and restraint of
competition that injure the public interest in promoting innovation.’”71 In
short, proponents of a price discrimination defense to patent tying must show
that those patent holders that seek to impose a tying requirement would not
achieve sufficient profits from merely charging the supracompetitive price for
the patented product to make future investments in innovation worthwhile.
3. The Risk of Overinvestment
The innovation justification for metered tying is founded on the premise
that the consumer surplus retained by consumers who pay the monopoly price
represents a pool of money that—if shifted to patentees through price discrimination—could spur more innovation. Klein and Wiley argue:
The inability of investors to appropriate the full value of such innovations
(because of incomplete property rights, free riding, and the inability of
prices to capture the full surplus) then is likely to make the private value of
the research investment smaller than the social value. This situation implies
a general underinvestment in innovations.72

Metered tying, however, may allow patentees to capture the full surplus.
Under a system of perfect price discrimination, “because the monopolist will
capture the full social benefit of the invention, the monopolist has the proper
incentive to invest the appropriate amount in an innovation.”73 This would
suggest that the law should affirmatively facilitate price discrimination by
patentees.
69 Tyler J. Gee, Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink: Inking Out Limits of the Patent Grant,
41 U.S.F. L. REV. 261, 293–94 (2006). Gee qualifies his statement by suggesting that “it seems
consistent with patent policy to allow the practice if tying is the only way to incentivize innovation in the tying product market.” Id. at 294. His caveat seems appropriate, but—as this section
argues—there is no evidence that “the only way to incentivize innovation” is by allowing patentees to engage in metered tying.
70 HEDVIG SCHMIDT, COMPETITION LAW, INNOVATION AND ANTITRUST 170 (2009) (emphasis
added) (quoting Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Competition Policy and Its Implications for Intellectual
Property Rights in the United States, in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY 142 (Steve Anderman ed., 2007)) (discussing 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d)(5)).
71 Id.
72 Klein & Wiley, supra note 19, at 618.
73 Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 159 n.158.
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The greater-investment case for metered tying assumes that, absent price
discrimination, there would be insufficient incentives for innovation. This argument raises several related considerations. First, as discussed above, there is
scant evidence that current incentives for innovation are deficient. Absent
such evidence, there is little reason to encourage patent tying in the name of
increasing the patent reward.
Second, economic theory tells us that increasing the gains from monopoly
may increase inefficient rent-seeking behavior. Increasing the value of a monopoly causes firms to expend more resources to acquire that monopoly. For
example, if a particular monopoly is expected to generate $100,000 in monopoly profits, a rational firm may spend $90,000 to attain monopoly power in
that market. In contrast, if a particular monopoly is expected to generate $1
million in monopoly profits, a firm may spend $900,000 to attain monopoly
power in that market. If this were the entire story, then the expenditure would
be both rational and efficient. The inefficiency comes if multiple firms make
the same rational calculation. Thus, given a monopoly position that is expected to generate $1 million in profits, two firms might each individually
make the same calculation to spend $900,000 in pursuit of that monopoly.
Whichever firm secures the monopoly, society is worse off because $1.8 million has been spent to create $1 million worth of social value. This is
inefficient.74
Third, in the context of patents, this unproductive rent-seeking behavior
takes the form of inefficiently excessive research activity. Professor Arti Rai
notes that “the greater the reward associated with patent rights, the greater the
possibility of patent races that produce excessive or duplicative investment.”75
Patent scholars have recognized that “the lure of market power may cause
investment in inventive activity to exceed social surplus.”76 As price discrimination increases the patentees’ reward, firms will spend more resources to
acquire that market power.77 Alan Sykes notes that as price discrimination
increases patentee profits, “monopolists may invest resources in obtaining
monopoly, thereby dissipating monopoly profits ex ante and causing further
deadweight losses. With patents in particular, monopoly rents may be dissipated by excessive investment in the race to develop a new invention—a so74 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807
(1975).
75 Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation
Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 199 (2001);
see also SCOTCHMER, supra note 10, at 98 (“[S]trong intellectual property rights can lead to an
inefficient duplication of R&D costs, as firms vie for possession of those rights.”).
76 Kieff, supra note 9, at 705.
77 See Sykes, supra note 14, at 63 n.43 (“A possible offsetting factor is that price discrimination makes monopoly more profitable, and thus more resources may be expended by companies
in pursuit of a monopoly position.”).
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called patent race.”78 Einer Elhauge argues that “the patent race literature
proves that firms will make socially excessive (and often duplicative) investments if they capture all [of] the total surplus created by their innovations.”79
Inefficient patent races have a net negative effect on social welfare.80
In short, allowing the patentee to price discriminate through tying could
potentially cause inefficient overinvestment. This is bad from both a patent
and an antitrust perspective.81 In a non-patent context, the Supreme Court has
condemned metered tying precisely because it increases the gains from monopoly. In Jefferson Parish,82 the Supreme Court lamented that tying arrangements “can increase the social costs of market power by facilitating price
discrimination, thereby increasing monopoly profits over what they would be
absent the tie.”83
Supporters of price discrimination reject the overinvestment hypothesis.
For example, Klein and Wiley recognize the argument84 but rebut its premise.
They argue that the traditional story of inefficient monopoly rent-seeking involves conduct like lobbying, which generates no independent value for society. In contrast, they envision competition “for assets (such as intellectual
property) that permit a firm to produce differentiated (but not necessarily monopoly) goods that give it the ability to price above marginal cost and to price
discriminate.”85 In their view, “[c]ompetition for these assets proceeds via investments that are socially productive, not socially useless.”86
Furthermore, Klein and Wiley assert that because firms are likely to invest
their profits from price discrimination in efforts to “create a greater variety of
products, to improve their brand names, to multiply their retail outlets, or to
Id. at 57 (citing JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 394–99 (1988)).
Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit
Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 440 (2009).
80 Jonathan B. Baker, Competitive Price Discrimination: The Exercise of Market Power Without Anticompetitive Effects (Comment on Klein and Wiley), 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 647 n.13
(2003) (“Policies increasing incentives to innovate are generally a good thing because the social
return to innovation is widely believed to exceed the private return substantially. In unusual
circumstances, however, welfare could be reduced when innovation incentives are enhanced.
This might occur, for example, if innovation incentives were already excessive, as in a wasteful
patent race.”).
81 Kaplow, supra note 43, at 1875 (“Beyond its effects on the ratio, price discrimination also
raises the problem of disproportionately high rewards to patentees, which . . . can make for bad
patent policy independent of how such discrimination fares under antitrust analysis.”).
82 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
83 Id. at 14–15.
84 Klein & Wiley, supra note 19, at 616 (“The logic is that firms vying for a valuable monopoly status will waste even more resources in their quest for a prize magnified by a new right to
price discriminate.”).
85 Id.
86 Id.
78
79
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undertake R&D for product improvement . . . competition for the ability to
price discriminate is not necessarily wasteful at all but is very likely to be
socially efficient.”87 They assume that the profits associated with price discrimination will be invested in socially efficient ways. But they offer no empirical evidence. More importantly, although Klein and Wiley assume that the
expenditures are individually socially efficient, they neglect to address the
risk of duplicative activity that is collectively inefficient. This oversight is
critical because this risk is the primary thrust of the overinvestment hypothesis. As Michael Abramowicz explains:
On one hand, the ability of a patent holder to appropriate only monopoly
profits and not the full social benefit will decrease the amount of research
activity. On the other hand, each competitor’s concern with the private
rather than social marginal benefits and costs of its research endeavours will
tend to lead to excessive research activity. Even if the two effects happen to
offset one another, producing just the right amount of investment in social
innovation, there remains a second problem with patent races—that research
efforts may be duplicative. When many different inventors work independently toward the same goal, society’s resources may be inefficiently
channeled.88

Ultimately, this is an empirical question, and the answer undoubtedly varies
by industry.89 High-level generalizations cannot answer the question in the
abstract. Consequently, my point is not to argue that metered tying will necessarily lead to inefficient patent races or other monopoly rent-seeking behavior.
Rather, it is to argue that the net effect on innovation is indeterminate. This
uncertainty undermines the innovation arguments in favor of patent tying.

B. QUESTIONING PATENT TYING AS A FUNDING
MECHANISM FOR INNOVATION
One common defense of strong patent rights is that patent profits fund future innovation.90 Some respected commentators have suggested that patentees
Id. at 616–17.
Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 185.
89 See generally BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5.
90 Erin Donovan, Beans, Beans, The Patented Fruit: The Growing International Conflict over
the Ownership of Life, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 117, 130 (2002) (“For instance,
without patent protection, biotech companies will not have profit margins sufficient to fund new
research.”); Richard S. Gruner, Corporate Patents: Optimizing Organizational Responses to Innovation Opportunities and Invention Discoveries, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 42 (2006)
(“Value returned in connection with an initial patented advance can help to fund further innovative efforts”); Diane Christine Renbarger, Putting the Brakes on Drugs: The Impact of KSR v.
Teleflex on Pharmaceutical Patenting Strategies, 42 GA. L. REV. 905, 908 (2008) (“The pharmaceutical industry has stated that it depends largely on revenue from patented drugs to fund the
expensive research and development involved in creating new drugs.”); Diana A. Villamil, Redefining Utility in Determining the Patentability of DNA Sequences, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 238, 267 (2006) (“Patent law offers researchers the ability to recover costly research
87
88
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should be able to impose tying arrangements because they are innovators and
the additional profits from metered tying will reward prior investments and
fund future investments in research and development.91 Such reasoning is
problematic for several reasons. First, this argument assumes reinvestment in
innovation, but no empirical evidence proves that patentees who use metered
tying invest more in subsequent research than patentees who simply charge
the monopoly price for the patented product. It is important to remember that
price discrimination does not directly cause innovation. It is a pricing strategy.
We know that everything that improves the patentee’s bottom line does not
create a net increase in innovation. That is why patent law limits the scope
and duration of patents.
Second, even if the patentee could prove that it invested its excess profits in
innovative or other productive activity, that does not provide the basis for an
antitrust defense. In general, antitrust law does not permit defendants to escape liability by arguing that their monopoly profits go to charity or to subsidize a beneficial business venture. Similarly, the fact that the tying seller is an
innovative patent holder does not provide a defense for an otherwise illegal
tying arrangement. Most corporations are innovative—even if they do not
have innovations that are patented, or patentable, or used as tying products in
tie-ins. A firm may innovate to secure the patent and then try to expand the
reach or scope of its patent to increase profits with no pro-innovative effect.
Third, perhaps the most important criticism of the argument that patentees
should be able to engage in metered tying because the excess profits fund
future innovation is that such a defense has no limiting principle. Why
shouldn’t patentees be able to violate any law so long as the violation is profitable and some of the illegal proceeds will be invested in research and development? Patent owners could engage in a variety of anticompetitive behaviors
that would increase their returns. For example, they could form price-fixing
expenses, make profits with which to fund further research, and attract investors to expand on
this research.”); Clark A.D. Wilson, The TRIPS Agreement: Is It Beneficial to the Developing
World, or Simply a Tool Used to Protect Pharmaceutical Profits for Developed World Manufacturers?, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 243, 262 (2005) (“Because of the small number of highly
successful products, the twenty year market exclusivity provided by patent protection is necessary to generate enough profit to fund further research and development.”); Grant C. Yang, The
Continuing Debate of Software Patents and the Open Source Movement, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 171, 196 (2005) (“large companies are efficiently structured to capitalize on an invention
and to use patents to fund research to promote innovation”); see also Mentor Graphics Corp. v.
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 1388, 1394 (D. Or. 1997) (patentee can show
irreparable harm if competitor takes sales because this will “limit[] its ability to fund vital research and development”); Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 460 F. Supp. 812, 826 (D. N.J.
1978) (ordering injunction against patentee’s competitor because “the loss of profits resulting
from the increased competition would result in a reduction of funds available for testing and
research and development”).
91 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 36, at 355 (“Price discrimination does not generally reduce
consumer welfare when one appropriately accounts for all static and dynamic welfare effects.”).
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cartels with other patent owners. Suppose that two firms possess substitute
patents on printheads and that no non-infringing printheads exist. In a competitive market, neither firm can charge the monopoly price because the other
firm would undercut it. If the firms colluded, however, each could raise price,
reduce output, and maximize their profits. Should they be able to conspire
simply because they are patentees and their agreement increases the rewards
flowing from their patents and the resources to invest in future research?
Probably not.92 The Supreme Court has suggested that simply because conduct
increases the profits to the patentee does not make that conduct legal under
antitrust laws;93 rather, a limiting principle is necessary.
In sum, mere possession of a patent does not grant patentees free rein to
increase their profits in the name of creating incentives to innovate. If patents
conferred such broad immunity from legal sanctions, then patentees could
form price-fixing cartels and pay non-infringing competitors to exit the market. But patents provide no defense to either of these acts; both are per se
illegal.

C. TYING

AND

PATENT SCOPE

Supporters of metered tying argue that because patentees are allowed to
price discriminate, they should be able to use tying arrangements as a mechanism to do so.94 A patent, however, does not confer any right to distort competition or interfere with consumer decisions in markets outside the scope of the
patent. This is true as a matter of both patent law and antitrust law.
With respect to patent law, the Supreme Court addressed tying arrangements in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.95
In that case, the patentee licensed its patented film projectors subject to the
licensee agreeing to use it only to show the patentee’s films. In evaluating the
legality of this tying condition, the Court looked to “the Patent Act, whose
relevant provision gave the patentee ‘the exclusive right to make, use, and
vend the invention or discovery,’ but said nothing about an exclusive right in
unpatented complementary products.”96 The Court held that patent laws did
HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 286.
United States v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287, 300 (1948) (noting that “[t]he original
context of the words” in its 1926 General Electric opinion “makes clear that they carry no
implication of approval of all a patentee’s contracts which tend to increase earnings on patents”).
94 See supra Part I.
95 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
96 HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE, supra note 8, § 4.2, at 4–17; Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 510 (“It has long been settled that the patentee receives nothing from the
law which he did not have before, and that the only effect of his patent is to restrain others from
manufacturing, using, or selling that which he has invented. The patent law simply protects him
in the monopoly of that which he has invented and has described in the claims of his patent.”).
92
93
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not confer upon patentees the right to “prescribe by notice attached to a patented machine the conditions of its use and the supplies which must be used in
the operation of it, under pain of infringement of the patent.”97 The Court
reasoned:
Such a restriction is invalid because such a film is obviously not any part of
the invention of the patent in suit; because it is an attempt, without statutory
warrant, to continue the patent monopoly in this particular character of film
after it has expired, and because to enforce it would be to create a monopoly
in the manufacture and use of moving picture films, wholly outside of the
patent in suit and of the patent law as we have interpreted it.98

Motion Picture Patents essentially established that tying can constitute patent
misuse. Congress has since narrowed the reach of the opinion by amending
the federal patent statute to provide that tying can be misuse only if the patentee has market power in the tying product market.99 By limiting the scope of
the patent misuse doctrine, however, Congress did not create an affirmative
right for patentees to impose tying requirements on buyers or licensees in
order to effect price discrimination.
As a matter of statutory antitrust law, having a patent is not a defense to a
tying claim. Section 3 of the Clayton Act explicitly prohibits patentees from
employing tying arrangements when the effect is to substantially lessen competition because the statute applies to tying products “whether patented or
unpatented.”100 The patent language in Section 3 is not an afterthought; indeed, the Senate version of the bill reached only those tie-ins involving a
patented tying product.101 The Congressional focus on patent tying represented
the legislators’ repudiation of the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in A.B.
Dick to allow patentees to impose tying requirements.

Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 509.
Id. at 518.
99 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5).
100 15 U.S.C. § 14.
101 One commentator explained:
The statutory language ultimately enacted into law as Section 3 of the Clayton Act
differed from both the language of the House of Representatives’ bill and the provision
originally adopted by the Senate. The distinction between the House bill and the Senate substitute as offered by Senator Walsh was that the House bill was intended to
cover all types of articles (patented or unpatented) used as the tying product, whereas
the Senate substitute was intended to apply only to patented articles. In conference,
however, the Senate conferees amended the Senate-approved bill to its present form. In
essence, the conferees adopted the provisions of the original House bill, eliminated the
penal provision, and further adopted the Senate Judiciary Committee’s addition of the
words ‘whether patented or unpatented.’
Byron A. Bilicki, Standard Antitrust Analysis and the Doctrine of Patent Misuse: A Unification
Under the Rule of Reason, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 209, 216–17 (1984).
97
98
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Defenders of tying arrangements seem to suggest that patent holders have
an affirmative right to engage in price discrimination and thus should be able
to employ tying arrangements to implement this pricing strategy.102 The premise of this line of argument is questionable for several reasons. First, patents
confer no affirmative rights. Patent owners have no statutory right to manufacture their inventions. For example, in the presence of blocking patents a
patentee may be unable to practice its invention because it infringes another’s
patent. Instead, patents confer the right to exclude others from making or selling the protected invention. More specifically, patents give inventors a right to
sue infringers for injunctive relief and damages. This is why Judge S. Jay
Plager of the Federal Circuit has lamented that the patent grant is actually
“‘little more than a right to litigate.’”103
Second, even if patentees enjoyed an affirmative right to price discriminate,
that does not translate into a right to use metered tying to effectuate such price
discrimination.104 Patents confer the right to exclude infringers, not the right to
engage without interference in any particular pricing structure.105 To the extent
that a particular tying arrangement may constitute patent misuse or violate
antitrust laws, patent law provides no defense for metered tying.
Finally, because patent rights are exercised through infringement litigation,
the relationship between infringement and tying can be instructive. To determine whether patentees have a right to engage in metered tying, it might be
useful to consider when a competitor’s effort to thwart the tie-in constitutes
infringement. In general, a patentee cannot sue rivals for selling complementary products used in conjunction with the patented product. But patent law
makes a distinction between staple products—those that have uses unrelated
to the patent product—and non-staple products that are specially designed for
use with the patented product. A rival’s sale of a non-staple product can constitute contributory infringement.106 That gives latitude to patentees to impose
ties. When the tied product is a non-staple, the patentee has the ability to
impose a tie-in because, as Michael Meurer notes, “[t]ies that serve to deter
contributory infringement fall into a safe harbor created in § 271(d) which

See supra Part I.
Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 774 (2009)
(quoting Interview with Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager, 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 6 (Dec. 1993)).
104 See United States v. Loew’s, 371 U.S. 38, 46–47 (1962) (“The patentee is protected as to
his invention, but may not use his patent rights to exact tribute for other articles.”); see also
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (“[T]he sale or lease of a
patented item on condition that the buyer make all his purchases of a separate tied product from
the patentee is unlawful.”).
105 See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
106 See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
102
103
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assures that such a tie is not misuse.”107 When the tied product is a staple,
however, the patentee cannot use patent law to prevent buyers and licensees
from using other manufacturers’ versions of the tied product. This suggests
that much metered tying falls outside of the scope of the patent.
In sum, given that patent law does not confer any right to price discriminate, tying arrangements cannot be justified as a means of effectuating this socalled right.

III. THE EFFECTS OF METERED TYING ON INNOVATION IN THE
TIED PRODUCT MARKET
While supporters of patent tying focus on innovation in the tying product
market, the more significant innovation effects are likely to be found in the
tied product market because this is the market that tying arrangements may
distort. This Part argues that patentees have an incentive to suppress innovation in the tied product market. And, whether by design or happenstance, tying arrangements can have the effect of reducing this innovation.108

A. THE PATENTEE’S ANTI-INNOVATION IMPULSE
The patentee may have a strong incentive to stifle innovation in the tied
product market. This is an independent reason to be concerned about conduct
that distorts competition in that market. It may seem that the tying seller
would want to encourage innovation in the tied product market because improving a complementary product should increase demand for the patentee’s
product. If, however, the innovator in the tied product market becomes sufficiently successful, it could undermine the patentee’s dominant position and
profitability in the tying product market.
First, the tied product can evolve in a manner that reduces demand for the
tying product (and in extreme cases renders the tying product unnecessary).
Innovators in the tied product market are potential long-term rivals in the ty107 Meurer, supra note 16, at 1895; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 779 F.
Supp. 1429 (D. Del. 1991), aff’d, 980 F.2d 742 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (suggesting that when the patentee holds patents on both the tying and tied products, and neither “could be considered a staple
item of commerce,” tying does not constitute patent misuse).
108 Some of the sources in this section that discuss how tying arrangements can reduce innovation in the tied product do not focus specifically on metered tying. Rather, these scholars analyze
scenarios in which the tying seller is attempting to foreclose competition in the tied product
market. In other words, they examine tying as a foreclosure device, not a metering device. Nevertheless, the tying arrangements discussed by these scholars, and their potentially negative effects, are relevant to the discussion of the effect of tying on innovation. If, by employing a tying
arrangement, a tying seller locks up a sufficient amount of the tied product market to meaningfully reduce the rewards for improving the tied product, then the tying can have anti-innovation
effects even if the tying seller’s primary goal was foreclosure (rather than metering).
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ing product market.109 In some markets, the threat to long-term entry into the
tying product market represents a greater menace to competition than the
short-term foreclosure in the tied product market. As the IP and Antitrust
treatise explains that “[t]he real concern of foreclosure is not leverage but
rather longer run stagnation and lack of competitive vitality. For example,
today’s producer of a tied product may be tomorrow’s producer of a tying
product. What better way to deter that firm’s entry than to deny it access to
the tied product market?”110 This, in essence, was the government’s theory in
the Microsoft case.111 Microsoft was concerned that browsers (and Java) could
evolve in a manner that made software application writers and consumers less
dependent on Microsoft’s operating system. Microsoft, according to the government, sought to stifle innovation in the markets for the tied product of
browsers. In short, a tying seller may want to stop innovation in the tied product market before it threatens the tying seller in the tying product market.
Second, if an innovator were to achieve dominance in the tied product market, it could diminish the tying seller’s ability to charge a monopoly price for
the tying product alone. When each of two firms has a monopoly, and their
products are complementary, both cannot charge the profit-maximizing monopoly price that each would charge in the absence of a monopolist in a complementary product market. As a result, the patentee may not be able to
charge the same supracompetitive price for the tying product. In an extreme
reversal of positions, the seller of the tied product could theoretically attempt
to enter the tying product market by means of its own tying arrangement—“I
won’t sell you the ‘formerly tied product’ unless you buy the ‘formerly tying
product’ from me.”
Under either of these scenarios, the original tying seller is in a worse position than if it had stifled innovation in the tied product market. To the extent
that suppliers of the tied product represent long-term threats to a patentee’s
dominant position in the tying product market, tying arrangements that reduce
rivals’ expected returns in the tied product market reinforce market dominance in the tying product market.112

109 See Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2091
(1999).
110 HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE, supra note 8, § 21.3, at 21–24.
111 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
112 Carlton & Waldman, supra note 34, at 197 (“The conclusion is that tying primary and
complementary goods can enable the initial monopolist to monopolize the newly emerging market by lowering the other producer’s return to entering that market.”).
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Tying arrangements can reduce competitors’ incentives and abilities to innovate in the tied product market for several related reasons. This Part considers four ways in which patent tying could distort innovation.
1. The Relationship Between Competition and Innovation
Tying arrangements can reduce competition in the tied product market. Tying law is based on the theory that tie-ins can permit a monopolist to leverage
its market power from one market into another.113 The Chicago School responded that such leveraging is not possible.114 While the Chicago School’s
philosophy on tying gained much traction in the 1980s,115 economists have
since explained how tie-ins can foreclose enough of the tied product market to
deter entry because new competitors may not be able to make enough sales to
cover their fixed costs or to achieve the minimum efficient scale to compete
profitably.116 In dynamic markets, “tying can be used to transfer monopoly
power from the primary market to a newly emerging market.”117 Carlton and
Waldman argue that “the use of tying to preserve a monopoly position will be
most important in industries characterized by substantial innovation where
product lifetimes are short.”118 Even so-called efficient metered tying can exclude competitors in the tied product market.119 Some tied product markets are
not susceptible to complete foreclosure because the tied product is a staple
that has many uses unrelated to the tying product.120 A tying seller, however,
may still want to reduce the number of sellers in the tied product market because this may make it easier for the tying seller to monitor its customers to
ensure that they are not circumventing the tie-in.121
Leslie, Tying Arrangements, supra note 29, at 729.
See, e.g., Bork, supra note 40, at 366–67; id. at 372 (“[T]here is no viable theory of a means
by which tying arrangements injure competition.”); cf. Posner, supra note 19, at 201 (describing
exclusion as “unlikely”).
115 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing for greater deference to tying arrangements); Leslie, Tying
Arrangements, supra note 29, at 740–41 (noting Chicago School’s influence on tying decisions,
including Justice O’Connor’s Jefferson Parish concurrence).
116 Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q.J. ECON. 159 (2004); Michael D.
Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990); see also Elhauge,
supra note 79, at 413–14.
117 Carlton & Waldman, supra note 34, at 194.
118 Id. at 196.
119 Nalebuff, supra note 116, at 183.
120 HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE, supra note 8, § 21.3, at 21–26 (“In sum, when
assessing tying foreclosure claims one must assess not only the defendant’s market position in
the tying market, but also the effective percentage of foreclosure in the tied market, and the latter
market can be far larger than the former, particularly where tied goods are staple commodities.”).
121 See Leslie, Metered Tying, supra note 39 (discussing the risk of customers evading a tying
requirement).
113
114
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If patent tying can, in fact, reduce competition in the tied product market,
then the innovation-related effects of tying might be viewed through the lens
of the Schumpeter-Arrow debate. Schumpeter argued that monopolists are
more innovative than firms in competitive markets.122 In contrast, Arrow argued that competition spurs greater innovation.123 For many, the dispute remains contested.124 The answer may depend on many other variables.125 Yet
much theoretical126 and empirical127 evidence supports Arrow’s position.
In a similar vein, when the competitors in the tied product market are
smaller firms—as is often the case—the exclusionary effects of metered tying
may have implications for innovation. In many (but not all) industries, smaller
firms are the major engines of innovation.128 For example, innovation flourished in software and Internet-related markets when dozens of small firms
122 See also John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare:
Innovation, Speculation, and Cable Bundling, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 916 (2001) (“Without
doubt, a monopolist may innovate in ways that build upon its embedded business.”).
123 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 72 (“Kenneth Arrow has argued that competition, not
monopoly, best spurs innovation because, to simplify greatly, companies in a competitive marketplace will innovate in order to avoid losing out to a competitor, while monopolists can afford
to be lazy and will fear that new inventions will steal their own markets.”) (citing Kenneth J.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 619–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962),
reprinted in 5 KENNETH J. ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: PRODUCTION
AND CAPITAL 104, 115–16 (1985)).
124 See, e.g., Lopatka & Page, supra note 122, at 915 (“But no confident prediction can be
made that an unconcentrated market will necessarily produce more innovation than a relatively
concentrated one.”).
125 SCOTCHMER, supra note 10, at 173 (“Whether competition promotes innovation better than,
for example, a market with concentrated market power depends, among other things, on the
nature of the innovative process and the innovative environment.”).
126 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 168 (“[L]arge, incumbent firms might be slow to
develop innovations that threaten to ‘cannibalize’ existing markets. Industry entrants and outsiders do not worry about displacing their existing product line and thus have stronger incentives to
develop technologies that replace older technologies. The theoretical literature that has developed this point is inconclusive, though, because in some cases incumbent firms will innovate
first to ‘preempt’ innovation by potential entrants. Either way, the existence of potential entrants
spurs innovation.”); Howard A. Shelanski, Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual and Other
Property, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 369 (2009).
127 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 13 (“[S]everal studies suggest that a moderate degree
of competition might actually spur innovation.”); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 277 n.71 (2007) (collecting authorities); K. Pavitt, M. Robson &
J. Townsend, The Size Distribution of Innovating Firms in the U.K.: 1945–1983, 35 J. INDUS.
ECON. 297 (1987); see also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 877 (1990) (noting “empirical evidence that the granting of broad patents in many cases has stifled technical advance and that where technical advance has been rapid there almost always has been considerable rivalry”).
128 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 127, at 276 (“smaller companies are often more innovative than larger companies with significantly greater R&D budgets”); cf. BURK & LEMLEY, supra
note 5, at 41 (“evidence suggesting that the relationship between firm size and significance of
innovation is not universal, but is itself industry-specific”).
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competed.129 Professors Burk and Lemley note that the nature of innovation
differs based on firm size, with smaller firms “disproportionately likely to
engage in breakthrough innovations” and larger firms making incremental improvements.130 To the extent that Arrow is correct, having fewer independent
manufacturers of the tied product reduces the likelihood of innovation.131
2. The Competitor’s Incentive to Innovate in the Tied Product Market
In the face of patent tying, the tying seller’s competitors in the tied product
market have a reduced incentive to innovate because they cannot make sales
of an improved tied product to consumers who are contractually bound to
purchase exclusively from the tying seller.132 For example, A.B. Dick’s competitors had little incentive to develop higher quality stencils because even if
they succeeded in making a better product, mimeograph users subject to A.B.
Dick’s tying requirement could not purchase and use the improved stencil.133
In sum, the competitor in the tied product market has less incentive to innovate because even if its product is superior, consumers will not be able to
purchase and use it.134
This concern that a tying seller could use a tie-in to stifle innovation in a
tied product market has animated government cases against Microsoft both in
the United States and Europe. The U.S. Department of Justice pursued its
antitrust case against Microsoft in part because of the anti-innovation effects
of tying. Microsoft possessed monopoly power in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems, but feared that Internet browsers could evolve
in a manner that would undermine its monopoly if software developers could
129 See id. at 73; see also id. (noting “empirical evidence suggesting that competition is a better
spur to innovation than monopoly even in the telecommunications industry”).
130 See id. at 41 (“The evidence is disputed, and patterns are not entirely clear, but it does seem
that small firms are more efficient innovators and that they are disproportionately responsible for
the most important innovations.”).
131 The Schumpeter-Arrow debate, however, does not map neatly onto the tied product market
because such innovation takes place in the shadow of the patented tying product. The tying
arrangement may distort innovation incentives in a manner that is not accounted for in the
broader discussion over which market structure maximizes innovation. See infra notes 150–165
and accompanying text.
132 This assumes that enough consumers do not want to breach their contract or that sellers of
the tied product are unwilling to invest if recoupment is based on a sufficient number of consumers breaching their agreements with the tying seller.
133 See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation
Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259 (2009) (making a similar argument with biopsy gun needles).
134 Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 475–76 (3d Cir.
1992) (“[A]nother fear has been that the second monopoly could impede innovation in the tied
product market by reducing competitive pressure in that market.”); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of
New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[I]nsofar as tying impedes ‘competition
on the merits,’ discouraging the search for innovation or efficiency, it does so in the tied product
markets.” (internal citation omitted)).
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write applications based on browsers instead of operating systems. Software
developers would no longer have to write their applications to run only on
Microsoft’s Windows operating system; if applications ran on browsers, consumers could buy any operating system and still run these applications.
Microsoft sought to prevent browser technology from progressing in that
direction by imposing a tie-in whereby purchasers of Microsoft’s operating
system would have to use its browser, Internet Explorer, as well. The tie-in
was initially contractual in nature but Microsoft later made it a technological
tie-in by commingling the code for its operating system and browser.
Microsoft’s goal was not to monopolize the browser market in order to extract
monopoly profits from browser sales, but rather to prevent innovation in the
browser market that would destabilize Microsoft’s valuable monopoly over
operating systems. Microsoft succeeded in suppressing innovation in the
browser market.135
The European Commission expressed similar concerns about Microsoft’s
conduct, albeit with a different tied product. There, “the Commission feared
that the tying of Windows Media Player (WMP) and Windows would foreclose competition and stifle innovation in the related media software encoding
and management markets because WMP would become the preferred choice
for complementary content and application providers.”136 In both instances,

135 Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247, 252 (2007)
(“Microsoft was engaged in suppressing the innovations of others.”).
Microsoft also thwarted innovation by stopping the threat of Sun Microsystem’s Java technology, which would allow software developers to write their applications in a language that any
operating system could read. Microsoft eliminated the Java threat not through tying—as it did
with browsers—but by developing a non-compatible version of Java and then deceiving software
developers into believing that the Microsoft version of Java would allow customers to run their
programs on any operating system when in reality they would only run on Windows. The en
banc D.C. Circuit held this violated Section 2. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
Economists Choi and Stefanadis have argued that Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct directed at the prior-dominant browser, Netscape’s Navigator, and at Java combined to increase the
anti-innovation effects of its tying arrangement. They explain:
By tying its operating system to its Internet Explorer, Microsoft makes entry in one
component dependent upon success in the other: Netscape can gain access to consumers and earn a significant profit mainly if Java succeeds, and vice versa. Tying may
thus make the prospects of investment in Netscape Navigator or Java more uncertain,
reducing these rivals’ incentive for innovation.
Jay Pil Choi & Christodoulos Stefanadis, Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory,
32 RAND J. ECON. 52, 53–54 (2001) [hereinafter Tying]; see also Jay Pil Choi & Christodoulos
Stefanadis, Bundling, Entry Deterrence, and Specialist Innovators, 79 J. BUS. 2575, 2577 (2006)
[hereinafter Bundling] (“As both operating systems and Internet browsers are characterized by
continuous innovation, bundling may allow Microsoft to reinforce its dominant position by
preventing specialist competitors, such as Sun and Netscape, from coordinating dynamically and
introducing product improvements into the two markets.”).
136 SCHMIDT, supra note 70, at 30.

840

ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 77

competition law authorities recognized how a tying arrangement can affect the
likelihood of innovation in the tied product market.
Tying by a patentee may make it harder for a firm that specializes in the
tied product market to recoup its fixed costs and initial investment in research.137 This argument should not prove controversial because it mirrors the
justification that price discrimination advocates make for metered tying—innovators must earn sufficient return on investment to make innovation efforts
profitable. Economists Choi and Stefanadis argue that this concern animated
the European Commission’s decision to block the 2001 proposed merger between General Electric and Honeywell, leading manufacturers of aircraft engines and avionics equipment, respectively. They report that the “European
Commission was concerned that the merged company would bundle its products, thereby discouraging more specialized competitors, such as Pratt &
Whitney and Rolls Royce, in engines, or Rockwell Collins, in avionics, from
introducing product improvements into their markets.”138 Whether the EC’s
prediction would have proved accurate, we cannot know, but the reasoning is
logical. For example, if General Electric were to use its dominant position in
aircraft engines to coerce airplane manufacturers to purchase avionics from
the merged company, other avionics companies would not be competing on a
level playing field. The market for avionics equipment is sufficiently small
that the predicted foreclosure of part of that market can distort research decisions. It makes less sense to invest in avionics technology research if one
cannot sell the resulting equipment in a completely competitive market.139 The
result would be to reduce innovation in the tied product market—avionics in
this case.
It may seem like many of the items selected to be a metering product—ink
or punchcards, for instance—are uniform or standardized in a way that does
not lend itself to innovation, like Internet browsers and avionics do.140 But
even pedestrian products experience innovation. In theory, for example, Inde137 Choi & Stefanadis, Bundling, supra note 135, at 2576 (“[B]undling may prevent the dynamic coordination of specialist entrants. When specialist innovators need to earn immediate
profits to justify their entry into the market—either because of the existence of financial constraints or the presence of immediate fixed costs that cannot be recouped by future profits—they
are forced to stay out of the market because of bundling.”); Carlton & Waldman, supra note 34,
at 196 (“[T]ying can stop the alternative producer from ever entering the complementary market
by eliminating the profits associated with the alternative producer selling complementary units in
the first period, thereby making it impossible to cover the fixed costs of entry.”).
138 Choi & Stefanadis, Bundling, supra note 135, at 2577 (citations omitted).
139 See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States , 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) (“By conditioning
his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller coerces the abdication of buyers’
independent judgment as to the ‘tied’ product’s merits and insulates it from the competitive
stresses of the open market.”).
140 Similarly, markets for staples are generally considered less susceptible to monopolization.
See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE, supra note 8, § 21.3 at 21–25 (“Foreclosure is
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pendent Ink could have developed a superior ink.141 Trident’s internal documents showed that competitive pressure existed to make ink that dried
faster.142 Further, some of Trident’s customers preferred rivals’ ink because it
was “blacker.”143 Even if Independent Ink did not improve the quality of the
ink itself, it could have conceivably developed a way to make the same ink
more efficiently. There is little possibility of such innovation if the rival firm
is driven from the specialty ink market.
Even if tied products are often staples in which innovation does not routinely occur, metered tying can affect the likelihood of innovation when the
tied product is a form of service. For example, the metering in Kodak depended in large part on the tying seller eliminating ISOs, which would interfere with its price discrimination plan.144 While this strategy would make it
harder for Kodak’s customers to cheat by purchasing market-priced service
from ISOs, it also kept ISOs out of a market in which they could be potential
innovators. An ISO is probably unlikely to craft a new competing copier. But
innovation may come in the form of developing more efficient means of servicing copiers. When multiple firms are exposed to the machines, it potentially increases the likelihood of innovation.
Finally, contrary to his conclusion, Bowman’s observation that without tying, patentees will not capture the entire value associated with their innovations may counsel against allowing patent tying. Bowman asserted that if
patentees do not collect the full value of their inventions, they will underinvest in research and development.145 Professors Frischmann and Lemley explain why this is not the case. First, they note that “at some point, there are
rarely a concern when the tied product is a staple, because attaining foreclosure in such cases is
virtually impossible, even if the patentee is a monopolist in the upstream market.”).
141 After all, Trident argued that other inks were inferior and more likely to lead to clotting and
printhead malfunction. Grimes & Sullivan, supra note 37, at 345 (“Trident argued that the tied
sale of its ink insured that customers would not purchase inferior inks that could cause the
printhead to malfunction. But Trident’s own test showed that Independent Ink’s product was
chemically indistinguishable from its own.”) (citing Brief for Respondent at 5–6, Illinois Tool
Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 2427645).
Trident’s assertion was untrue, as at the time of the litigation, Independent Ink’s product had the
“same chemical composition” as Trident’s tied product. Trident’s claim of varying ink quality
does suggest that innovations in ink were possible.
142 For example, Trident’s own customers expressed a desire for “quicker drying ink.” Exhibit
24, Joint Appendix, vol. III, Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28
(2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 1865981.
143 Exhibit 25, Joint Appendix, vol. III, Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547
U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 1865981.
144 See Klein & Wiley, supra note 19, at 601–02 (“To make this price discrimination strategy
work, however, it was essential that Xerox and Kodak block ISOs from obtaining replacement
parts and supplying lower-priced service directly to high-intensity Kodak and Xerox
customers.”).
145 BOWMAN, supra note 43, at 112.
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decreasing returns (in terms of improved incentives) to allowing property
owners to capture more of the value from their inventions.”146
Second, they explain that this uncaptured value represents a spillover and
that empirical evidence shows “that firms in high-technology industries (the
most innovation-intensive ones) are likely to increase rather than decrease
their R&D investment in the face of significant intra-industry spillovers.”147 In
the context of patent tying, many buyers are innovators themselves, who can
invest their consumer surplus into research and development. For example,
firms that use Trident’s printheads thrived in a wide range of businesses; their
principal commonality was that they shipped their products in boxes that had
used Trident’s printheads to print labels on them. The consumer surplus these
various firms enjoyed by using Trident’s printheads could be invested in innovations completely unrelated to printheads or ink.
Third, the amount of the spillover is not a measure of underinvestment. So
long as the reward actually received by the patentee is sufficient, it does not
matter how much additional value is left on the table in the form of consumer
surplus. Professors Frischmann and Lemley explain:
[I]nventors do not need to capture the full social value of their inventions in
order to have sufficient incentive to create. Society needs merely to give
them enough incentive to cover the fixed costs of creation that their imitators
will not face. Any greater return is at best a mere wealth transfer and at
worst wasteful—it doesn’t encourage any more innovation in the field, and
it may actually interfere with downstream innovation and distort behavior in
the market. Thus, while we need some ex ante incentive to innovate, we
don’t need (and don’t particularly want) full internalization of the benefits of
an invention. As long as we get enough incentive, the fact that other benefits
aren’t captured by the innovator doesn’t impose any real cost on innovation,
and may even contribute to innovation.148

In short, the presence of consumer surplus does not represent a flaw in our
patent system. It represents a benefit for society that may in turn generate
more innovation.149
3. The Patentee’s Incentive to Innovate in the Tied Product Market
When a patentee with monopoly power in the tying product market imposes
a tying requirement, it has less incentive to improve the tied product because
Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 127, at 258.
Id. at 269 (citing Dietmar Harhoff, R&D Spillovers, Technological Proximity, and Productivity Growth—Evidence from German Panel Data, 52 SCHMALENBACH BUS. REV. 238, 258
(2000)).
148 Id. at 276.
149 See id. at 258 (“Spillovers do not always interfere with incentives to invest; in some cases,
spillovers actually drive further innovation.”).
146
147
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consumers must already purchase the tied product from it as a result of the tiein. In non-tying contexts, the monopolist’s incentive to innovate is to stay
ahead of inventive rivals. With an effective tying arrangement in place, however, the tied product is insulated from such competitive pressures. The tying
seller may have incentive to innovate in the tying product market, but not in
the tied product market.
The tying seller has less incentive to improve the tied product because the
marginal benefit of product improvement is diminished. Posner has argued
that if the tying seller has a monopoly in the tying product, it has no incentive
to acquire a second monopoly in the complementary market for the tied product.150 If he is right, then the tying seller has no incentive to innovate in the
tied product market because the tying seller can sell the tied product without
innovating, and the seller does not gain anything by actually monopolizing the
complementary market. Posner, however, overstated the case. A tying seller
may have an incentive to monopolize the complementary market for the tied
product if there are uses of the tied product separate from its use with the
tying product.151 Professors Ordover and Willig explain:
Monopoly power over one component of a system . . . is not always sufficient for a dominant firm to extract all the monopoly profits obtainable in
the systems market. In such instances, the dominant firm can increase its
profit by inducing the exit of a rival and thereby extending its monopoly
power to other systems components.152

Thus, the tying seller still has a marginal incentive to acquire monopoly
power in the tied product market. Posner’s insight still has relevance, though,
because the tying seller receives a smaller benefit for improving the tied product since it has already locked up a sizeable portion of the tied product market
through the tie-in. In short, the tying seller may have little reason to expend
resources on research and development when the incremental gain in market
share associated with innovation is slight.
4. Dual Market Entry, R&D Budgets, and Innovation
Finally, a tying seller can use a tie-in to stifle competition and innovation in
the tied product market by forcing rivals to enter two markets concurrently. In
condemning tying arrangements, the Supreme Court has opined that “one of
the evils proscribed by the antitrust laws is the creation of entry barriers to
potential competitors by requiring them to enter two markets simultane150 POSNER, supra note 19, at 198–99 (“[A] fatal . . . weakness of the leverage theory is its
inability to explain why a firm with a monopoly of one product would want to monopolize a
complementary product as well.”).
151 Whinston, supra note 116.
152 Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and
Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 31 (1981).
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ously.”153 Because “entry into both markets is significantly more expensive
than simple entry into the tied market,” tying renders markets less
competitive.154
By forcing a rival in the tied product market to enter the tying product
market as well, a tie-in can reduce the likelihood of innovation in the tied
product market for several related reasons. First, if an entrant in the tied product market must enter both the tying and tied products markets in order to
reach minimum efficient scale, then the new contender may not be able to
compete because it does not have the experience or resources to enter the
tying product market.155 Furthermore, because of its inexperience, its capital
costs will be relatively higher than the tying seller’s costs, which represents an
additional barrier to entry.156
Second, if a competitor must successfully enter two markets in order to
compete, then tying can force it to divide its research, development, and marketing budgets across two different products. Tying forces the spreading out
of R&D resources; this essentially dilutes the amount of research that can be
conducted in the tied product market.157
Third, specialization is more likely to lead to innovation.158 If tying induces
tied product makers to disperse their research budgets across markets, it can
warp competition in the tied product market. In particular, “by forcing every
single entrant to spread out its R&D resources among components, bundling
distorts specialization decisions and lowers the probability of successful entry.”159 Economists note that “by distorting the specialization decisions of rivals, bundling inefficiently buttresses the incumbent’s position.”160
Fourth, having to enter two markets lowers the expected profits from innovation in the tied product market. Investment in research often precedes inno153 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 485 (1992) (citing Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984); Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel
Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495, 509 (1969)).
154 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13 n.19 (quoting Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512–14 (White, J.,
dissenting)); see also Leslie, Tying Arrangements, supra note 29, at 819 (discussing United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.).
155 Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of
the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (1979).
156 Id.
157 See SCHMIDT, supra note 70, at 41–42 (noting the “argument that tying by a dominant
company can suppress innovation on the tied product market, because foreclosure of the product
market converts into foreclosure of the R&D market”).
158 Choi & Stefanadis, Bundling, supra note 135, at 2588 (“Firms that focus on their core
competencies . . . have a higher probability of exhibiting superior performance in their core
sectors than diversified companies.”).
159 Id. at 2589–90.
160 Id. at 2576.
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vation, the development of a new product, and successful entry into a product
market.161 By reducing the incentives for rival firms in the tied product market
to invest in research and development, metered tying can diminish the flow of
new and better products into the marketplace.162 Creating uncertainty about
the prospects of having and winning a fair fight in the tied product market
reduces research and innovation in that market.163 If a new firm intent on
improving the tied product must enter two markets in order to have a successful presence, then this will reduce the return on the research investment,164
which makes innovation less profitable and less likely.165
One could posit that the above arguments against tying arrangements do not
apply when the tying product is patented because the tying seller has acquired
its market power legitimately and the patent excludes competitors in the tying
product market, not the tie-in. There is some truth to this proposition. But the
argument is weakened by the possibility of design around. The process of
competitors designing around patents is part and parcel of the patent system.166 Indeed, designing around existing patents is critical to maintaining innovation in a patent-laden free market economy. The Federal Circuit opined
that “[o]ne of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to ‘design around’ a competitor’s products, even when they are patented,
thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace.”167 Tying, however, can reduce the likelihood of design-around. Although they do not discuss design-around explicitly, Choi and Stefanadis’s work—as well as
Carlton and Waldman’s analysis—suggest that tying can reduce the incentives
161 Choi & Stefanadis, Tying, supra note 135, at 52 (“A potential entrant can enter the market if
it succeeds in innovation and obtains a superior technology; the probability of success depends
on the level of its R&D expenditures.”).
162 Jay Pil Choi, Tying and Innovation: A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangements, 114 ECON.
J. 83, 83 (2004) (“Tying arrangements prevent competitors from having a fair chance to reach
consumers. This market foreclosure translates into reduced R&D incentives for the rival firms.
Thus, it is possible that tying arrangements drive better products and services out of the market.”). Choi also suggests that tying can signal a commitment by the tying seller to make a “more
aggressive R&D investment in the tied goods market,” which also “has the strategic effect of
dulling the R&D incentives of rival firms.” Id. at 85.
163 Choi & Stefanadis, Bundling, supra note 135, at 2579 (“By making the prospects of investment less certain, bundling discourages rivals from investing and innovating.”).
164 Nalebuff, supra note 116, at 163 (“Choi and Stefanadis [2001] also rely on a commitment to
bundle as a way to deter entry. In their model, A and B are only of any value when consumed
together. Thus, an incumbent bundle completely forecloses a one-product entry. Innovation has a
lower expected payoff as success in both the A and B good is required to gain access to the
market.”).
165 If there is enough demand for the tied product, independent of its use in conjunction with
the tying product, then some firms may enter the former market alone. But fewer firms can do
this.
166 WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“patent law
encourages competitors to design or invent around existing patents”).
167 State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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for rivals to research and design around a patent that serves as a basis for a
tying arrangement. If the tying arrangement provides a barrier to entry into the
tying product market,168 then tying seller can reduce incentive of sellers to
design around the patent.

C. SUMMARY
When patentees employ metered tying, both the tying seller and its competitors in the tied product market may have less incentive to innovate in the tied
product market. The tying seller has less incentive because it can make sales
of the tied product without innovating. The competitors in the tied product
market have less incentive because the rewards from innovation are
diminished.
Competing theories exist about the effects of patent tying on innovation.
Each theory accurately describes some industries at some junctures. . But that
does not mean that the theories are equally persuasive. The story of how patent tying facilitates innovation is a bit roundabout—the tying seller earns additional profits through price discrimination and may reinvest that money in
future innovation. The competing theory of anti-innovation is more causal: the
tie-in directly reduces—and perhaps eliminates—the competitors’ incentive to
improve the tied product. The ultimate question is which theory, if either,
explains more markets. That is an empirical question that cannot be answered
here. However, some economists have concluded that legal restrictions on tying can have a net positive effect on social welfare.169
In short, metered tying creates greater rewards associated with the patented
tying product but does so at the expense of reducing innovation rewards in the
tied product market. The overall effect of metered tying may be a net decline
in innovation.170

168 Carlton & Waldman, supra note 34, at 195 (“We assume that the two firms have equivalent
primary products in the second period but the alternative producer has a superior complementary
product in both periods. In our specification the monopolist has no incentive to tie if there is no
threat of entry into the primary market in the second period, but does have such an incentive
when such entry is possible.”).
169 Id. at 203 (“when the monopolist has an incentive to tie, a prohibition on tying increases
social welfare”).
170 Choi & Stefanadis, Tying, supra note 135, at 52 (“We show that when an incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry in all complementary components, tying may make the prospects of successful entry less certain, discouraging rivals from investing and innovating. Tie-in
sales may reduce consumer and total economic welfare.”); see also Gee, supra note 69, at 295
(“The law should be cautious of ties that may cause a patent in the tying product market to trump
another’s innovation in the tied product market.”).
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IV. MOVING FORWARD
Some scholars have argued that patentees who impose tying requirements
should get some measure of deference from antitrust courts in the name of
innovation. Parts II and III question this argument. Yet, even if the innovation
arguments in favor of patent tying are overstated, tying law is still overly
restrictive. In this Part, I briefly discuss patent tie-ins in the context of antitrust law on tying more generally. I propose treating patent and non-patent
tying equally, but under a true rule of reason standard instead of the current
nominal per se rule, which in practice operates as a truncated rule of reason.

A. APPLY TYING LAW EQUALLY

TO

PATENT TIE-INS

The fact that some tying arrangements are imposed by patent-holding innovators does not mean that patent tying should receive greater deference under
antitrust law. Patents are only sometimes relevant to antitrust law. Most notably, patents provide a defense to Section 2 liability in that acquiring and maintaining a monopoly through legally held patents does not constitute predatory
exclusion. But this does not translate into a broad exemption from antitrust
liability.171 The Supreme Court has long recognized that the mere possession
of a patent provides no exemption from otherwise applicable antitrust laws.172
Patentees can violate antitrust laws in a variety of ways. For example, antitrust law condemns agreements among patents to cartelize173 or divide markets,174 bars certain patent pools175 or patent settlements,176 and precludes
patentees from bringing frivolous patent infringement lawsuits that create or
reinforce monopoly power.177 Most importantly for our purposes, patents do
not provide a defense to tying, and Section 3 of the Clayton Act clearly states
that patent tying can be illegal.178 Not even the Federal Circuit’s pro-patentee
opinion in Xerox suggested that tying law did not apply to patent holders.179
171 See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196–97 (1963) (“[T]he possession of a
valid patent or patents does not give the patentee any exemption from the provisions of the
Sherman Act beyond the limits of the patent monopoly.”).
172 See, e.g., United States v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948) (“It is equally well
settled that the possession of a valid patent or patents does not give the patentee any exemption
from the provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the patent monopoly.”).
173 See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
174 See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, clarified by 324 U.S. 570
(1945).
175 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Cinram, 299 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D. Del. 2004).
176 See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
177 See, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984).
178 15 U.S.C. § 14.
179 In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the
absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham
litigation, the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using,
or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust laws.”).
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Antitrust law should treat patent tie-ins the same way it treats tying arrangements not involving patented products or processes. In their Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, the Antitrust Division and the
Federal Trade Commission promised to “apply the same general antitrust
principles to conduct involving intellectual property that they apply to conduct
involving any other form of tangible or intangible property.”180 Scholars, too,
have argued that antitrust law should apply the same standards to intellectual
and tangible property.181
If patentees were able to impose tying requirements when other sellers cannot, it could result in the former being over-rewarded. As Louis Kaplow has
explained:
If patentees, but not others, are permitted to engage in discriminatory practices, price discrimination might enable patentees to recover even more than
the total economic surplus generated by their invention without resorting to
any disguised cartelization. A patentee would reap this benefit if its price
discrimination enabled it to capture not only the surplus generated by its
invention, but also the surplus that would have gone to consumers or other
producers in the absence of the patentee’s invention.182

Kaplow’s reasoning explains another potential effect of patent tying. If patentees were able to implement metered tying without restriction, they could conceivably extract all of the consumer surplus from the patented tying product
market and the non-patented tied product market. While the former may be
defensible as a matter of economic theory, the latter is not. If antitrust’s rule
against tying is to apply equally to patentees and non-patentees, this leads to
the important issue of what the test for liability should be.

B. FIX TYING LAW GENERALLY: REQUIRE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS
Some may object to treating patent tie-ins like other tie-ins because they
view antitrust’s treatment of non-patent tying arrangements as too restrictive.
But if antitrust’s tying prohibition is too sweeping, the answer is not to give
patent holders special deference when they tie simply because they have patents. The better response is to correct tying law more broadly. Tying arrangements can have procompetitive, anticompetitive, or competitively benign
effects. Antitrust law should condemn anticompetitive uses of tying arrangements, but it should not proscribe procompetitive and competitively neutral
180 U.S. Dept. of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property § 2.1 (1995) (“Intellectual property has important characteristics . . . that
distinguish it from many other forms of property. These characteristics can be taken into account
by standard antitrust analysis, however, and do not require the application of fundamentally
different principles.” (footnote omitted)).
181 See, e.g., Shelanski, supra note 126.
182 Kaplow, supra note 43, at 1875.
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tie-ins. One way to distinguish between anticompetitive and procompetitive or
competitively neutral tying arrangements is to require tying plaintiffs to show
that the challenged tie-in actually injures competition.
Federal courts characterize tying arrangements as “per se illegal.”183 This
label, however, is misleading. When an agreement falls into the per se category, this generally relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving either that
the defendant possesses market power or, more importantly, that the challenged agreement unreasonably restrains competition. Furthermore, the defendant is not permitted to present a defense of its restraint on trade—e.g., a
legitimate business justification—or to argue that the particular agreement in
the case at hand does not injure competition.
Antitrust condemnation of tie-ins lacks the hallmarks of true per se illegality. Before a court will find a tying arrangement per se illegal, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant has market power over the tying product184 and
that a not insubstantial dollar volume of commerce in the tied product market
is affected.185 Also, courts have sometimes allowed the defendant an opportunity to argue that a legitimate business reason justifies its imposition of the
tie-in.186 And some circuit courts have formulated their per se standard for
183 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (“It is far too late in the
history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements
pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable ‘per se.’”); In re
Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., No. 03-CV-04576, 2010 WL 3835869, at *26 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24,
2010) (“Activities such as horizontal price fixing, market allocation, group boycotts, or tying
arrangements are so inherently anticompetitive, they are considered illegal per se. Because these
actions are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable, no inquiry into the harm actually caused is
required.”) (citations omitted); St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1069,
1094 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (“Examples of the per se standard include price fixing, tying arrangements, and group boycotts . . . . A plaintiff who has satisfied the per se standard need not prove
any anticompetitive effects from the alleged restraint.”) (citations omitted).
184 See United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47–48 (1962).
185 See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969); Station
Enters., Inc. v. Ganz, Inc., No. 07-CV-14294, 2009 WL 2926572, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10,
2009) (“[U]nder current per se analysis, the antitrust plaintiff must show the seller possesses
substantial market power in the tying product market and that the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market.”) (citing Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462, 478–79).
186 See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 555–60 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff’d per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d
1342, 1348–49 (9th Cir. 1987) (“We have recognized that antitrust defendants may demonstrate
a business justification for an otherwise per se illegal tying arrangement.”) (citing Roberts v.
Elaine Powers Figure Salons, Inc., 708 F.2d 1476, 1482 (9th Cir. 1983); Metrix Warehouse, Inc.
v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1040 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing “business
justification defense” to tying claims); Roberts v. Elaine Powers Figure Salons, Inc., 708 F.2d
1476, 1482 (9th Cir. 1983) (“If a tying arrangement exists, the trier of fact shall determine
whether [the defendant] has a business justification excusing it from liability.”); Betaseed, Inc. v.
U and I Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1225–28 (9th Cir. 1982); Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 664 F.2d
716, 738–39 (9th Cir. 1981); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir.
1977)); id. at 1349 (recognizing business justification as an “affirmative defense” in tying cases);
Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc. v. Augustine Med., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1549, 1562 (S.D. Ohio
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tying arrangements to require the plaintiff to prove that the challenged tie-in
has actual anticompetitive effects.187 This type of antitrust scrutiny is functionally equivalent to rule of reason analysis. The per se label for tying arrangements is, thus, inappropriate.
Nevertheless, many courts apply their per se rule against tying arrangements in a manner that “dispenses with proof of anticompetitive effects”188
once the plaintiff establishes market power and that a substantial dollar
amount of commerce is affected. This nominal application of the per se rule
against tying is overbroad when it does not require proof of anticompetitive
effects because many—perhaps most—tie-ins do not injure competition. The
Chicago School is correct when it argues that tie-ins should not be treated as
per se illegal. Tying does not “always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,”189 which is the standard for per se illegality.190
Courts should apply a rule of reason approach to all tie-ins, thus requiring
tying plaintiffs to show an injury to competition. A tying plaintiff can satisfy
this requirement by demonstrating anticompetitive effects in either the tying
or tied product markets. Under a true rule of reason test, many challenged
tying arrangements—whether used for price discrimination or not, and
whether the tying product is patented or not—may avoid antitrust liability.191
But if they do not cause antitrust harm, that is the proper result.

1992) (“One method a defendant may employ to legitimize a per se illegal tying arrangement is
to demonstrate a business justification for the tying arrangement.”), abrogated on other grounds
by Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2000).
187 See, e.g., United Farmers Agents Ass’n v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 F.3d 233, 235 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1996). Other courts require a finding that “anticompetitive forcing is likely” before condemning tie-ins as per se illegal. See, e.g., Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 712 F. Supp.
2d 974, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
15–16 (1984)).
188 Ganz, Inc., 2009 WL 2926572, at *6 (citing PSI Repair Services, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
104 F.3d 811, 815 n.2 (6th Cir.1997)); see also In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618
F.3d 300, 317 n.13 (3d Cir. 2010) (“‘[t]he ‘per se’ rule against tying goes only halfway [because]
. . . if the defendant is found to have market power [in the tying product], the plaintiff is, in
theory, relieved of proving actual harm to competition’”) (quoting Town Sound & Custom Tops,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 477 (3d Cir.1992) (en banc)).
189 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
289–90 (1985) (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)).
190 The Chicago position, however, goes too far when it advocates per se legality for tie-ins.
See, e.g., Bork, supra note 40, at 380–81; Frank Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the
Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 143–45 (1984); See William H. Page, The Chicago
School and Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1989) (noting that Chicago scholars argue for per se legality
of tie-ins).
191 HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 123 (“Most tying arrangements are efficient mechanisms for
organizing distribution of one’s good or service in order to increase consumer satisfaction, prevent free riding, or meter the use of intellectual property rights.”).
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Under a rule of reason approach, competitors excluded from the tied product market would be appropriate plaintiffs if they could show that the defendant’s tying injured competition. The lost sales of rival sellers in the tied
product market arguably constitute an antitrust injury.192 The presence of a
patent over the tying product does not negate this. Chicago School adherents
may argue that if tying gets the patentee more money, it is a transfer of
wealth. We must ask, however, from whom the wealth is being transferred
and whether such a transfer is appropriate. It may be that the transfer of
wealth from consumers of the tied bundle to the patentee is justifiable because
the consumers presumably benefit from the patented invention and from their
consumption of the bundle. But part of the transfer comes from excluded sellers of the unpatented tied product, who are making fewer sales and perhaps
being driven from that product market altogether. These sellers should not be
subsidizing the patent holder because they are neither infringing the patent nor
benefitting from it.193

C. A PRICE DISCRIMINATION DEFENSE

TO

PATENT TYING?

This leaves the issue of what role the price discrimination explanation
should play under a true rule of reason approach to tying claims. Commentators argue that “the fact or possibility of price discrimination does not itself
provide grounds for condemning tie-ins.”194 At the same time, however, the
possibility of price discrimination should not immunize a tie-in that is objectionable because of its proven anticompetitive effect. To the extent that the
rule of reason entails balancing, if there is an anticompetitive effect, what
should it be balanced it against? Some would argue innovation. Patent tying
advocates like Bowman suggest that the greater money to the patentee provided through price discrimination rewards innovation and encourages further
innovation. But this defense proves too much—every illegal act done by a
patentee is designed to increase its profits.195 More importantly, in Part III, I
provided many reasons to be suspicious of these innovation arguments in
general.
Proponents of the Chicago School have argued that antitrust law should not
condemn patent tying when it is used to facilitate price discrimination.196 This
Grill, supra note 47, at 1483 (discussing arguments from Illinois Tool Works case).
Perhaps sellers of complementary products would be gaining something if consumers of the
patented product increased their purchases of complementary products from them, but the tying
arrangement prevents this.
194 9 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1711c (2d ed. 2004).
195 See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
196 Posner, supra note 32, at 330–31 (“Since the law permits price discrimination (with immaterial exceptions), there is no reason why it should forbid tie-ins and thus force sellers to resort to
less efficient means of discrimination—if they were more efficient, a prohibition would be un192
193
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position, however, fails to consider that tying can injure competition in the
tied product market and inflict injury on rival sellers through sales lost on the
basis of competition on the merits. The patentee has every right to maximize
its return on the patented product so long as it does not engage in patent
misuse or violate any non-patent laws, including antitrust laws. For example,
owners of intellectual property can price discriminate. Software companies
charge different prices to different customer classes.197 This form of price discrimination does not distort competition in the markets for complementary
goods.198 The ability to price discriminate in some forms does not translate
into an affirmative right to price discriminate in all forms, particularly in the
form of metered tying that injures competition in the tied product market.
Instead, antitrust properly constrains how patentees can price discriminate.
Patent owners already have a variety of ways to engage in price discrimination that do not distort competition in markets beyond the scope of the patent.
Most simply, they can charge different prices to different buyers. This may
not always be possible given the risk of arbitrage. To minimize this risk, “[i]n
markets protected by IP, sellers often segment their buyers based on line of
business, location, field of technology, or whether the use is not-for-profit.
They implement this segmentation through contract terms that specify allowable uses. The usual goal of this marketing strategy is price discrimination.”199
Patentees can also restrict the frequency of use,200 as the patentee did in Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart Inc.201 when it limited the buyers of its medical
devices to a single use, presumably to prevent reconditioned devices from
being sold in a secondary market.202

necessary—unless the tie-in has a sinister purpose, which is the exceptional, not the normal,
case.”).
197 See, e.g., ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (“ProCD decided to
engage in price discrimination, selling its database to the general public for personal use at a low
price (approximately $150 for the set of five discs) while selling information to the trade for a
higher price.”).
198 Sellers of complementary goods may have to reduce their prices because as the price paid
for one good goes up, the demand for complementary goods goes down. This is how normal
markets function; it is not a suppression of competition.
199 Meurer, supra note 16, at 1877 (“For example, DuPont imposed a field of use restriction
and charged different prices for a patented synthetic fiber depending on the end use intended by
the customers.”) (citing Akzo v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1488 (Fed.
Cir. 1986)).
200 Id. at 1890 (“IP law bolsters frequency of use restrictions by adding infringement claims
and strong IP remedies to the breach of contract claims. Infringement claims are well grounded
in patent law because the patent owner has broad control over use.”).
201 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
202 See Meurer, supra note 16, at 1899 (discussing Mallinckrodt and noting that the court found
the single-use requirement to be a “valid contract term and enforced the restriction despite an
objection that the restriction violated the exhaustion doctrine”).
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Similarly, a patent owner can price discriminate while evading antitrust liability if the patentee directly meters usage instead of using a tie-in. Direct
metering is permissible because the patentee is extracting the higher price for
the patented product, not another product outside of the scope of the patent. If
a patent owner cannot meter directly, then it may be out of luck because Congress explicitly condemned patent tying that substantially lessens competition.
Alternatively, a patentee can peg its licensing fees to a licensee’s output. Indeed, the patentee can receive payments for all output, including that which
does not incorporate its patents.203 It is improper, however, for the patentee to
force consumers to buy a product outside of the scope of the patent in a manner that injures competition. In short, while a patent owner is allowed to meter
in order to effect price discrimination, it cannot distort competition in the
market for the tied product as part of its metering scheme.
So long as the elements of a tying claim (including anticompetitive effects)
are proven, then the fact that the patentee was using the tie-in as a metering
device should be irrelevant. The patent holder has the right to exclude competitors and charge any price it chooses. We tolerate monopoly pricing in the
patented product because the supracompetitive price is being paid by consumers who are directly benefiting from the patented product (which may not
have been developed but for the prospect of monopoly pricing). The patent
holder’s reward, however, should come by excluding competitors from the
market in which the patented product competes, not from complementary
markets outside the scope of the tying seller’s patent. Metering through tying
inflicts a cost on firms that do not purchase or directly gain from the patented
product.204 In a tied product market unconstrained by patents, it is simply
anathema to free competition that a patent in another product market should
serve as a barrier to entry in the tied product market. If the patent holder
injures competition in a complementary market in a manner that antitrust law
condemns, then the presence of the patent over the tying product provides no
defense because the tied product market lies outside of the scope of the patent.

V. CONCLUSION
The relationship between consumer welfare and innovation may require
some hard decisions to be made about what trade-offs should occur among
competing virtues. With respect to patent tying used to effect price discrimination, if anticompetitive tie-ins that eliminate consumer surplus are defended
based on innovation arguments, those defenses need to be vigorously vetted.
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
To the extent that the tying product is complementary to the tied product and, if desirable,
should increase the demand for the tied product, then makers of the tied product do receive
additional revenue from the popularity of the tying product. But this alone does not justify eliminating these firms from selling the tied product to customers subject to the tying requirement.
203
204
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If the elimination of consumer surplus increases innovation, then we have to
decide whether the trade-off is worth it. If, on the other hand, patent tying
eliminates consumer surplus without improving innovation, then there is less
reason to tolerate anticompetitive tie-ins.
Patent tying has been illegal for almost a century since the congressional
enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914. Yet, where is the evidence of diminished innovation? Money spent on research increases every year, as does the
number of patents issued. Firms innovate and patent their inventions despite
antitrust’s prohibition on tying.205 This would suggest that tying does not deter
research. Innovation is a function of many variables. It is not clear whether
the ability to use metered tying in a manner that injures competition in the tied
product market is a meaningful driver for innovation. To the extent that metered tying facilitates innovation, it bears noting that a proper antitrust regime
will only condemn those metered tie-ins that injure competition. This is a
narrow subset of patent tying. There is no evidence that this particular subset
of tie-ins is necessary to stimulate, encourage, and reward innovation in the
marketplace. Yet there is reason to believe that patent tying will reduce
innovation.206
At a minimum, given competing theories, supporters of metered tying
should have to demonstrate the increases in innovation they claim.207 There
should also be some effort to see how pro-tying theories apply across different
industries to ensure that the overall effect is pro-innovation and that any examples are not atypical.208 Legal doctrine should not be transformed based on
theory alone.209

205 See, e.g., SCOTCHMER, supra note 10, at 203 (“There was a 71 percent increase in patent
grants from 1978 to 1995.”).
206 See supra Part III.
207 See Baker, supra note 80, at 648 (“the net effect of the refusals to deal on industry-wide
incentives to innovate is not obvious”).
208 Id. at 647 (“The dynamic efficiency effects of allowing price discrimination also cannot be
determined as a matter of theory, as the practice might enhance industry innovation incentives in
some respects while reducing them in others.”).
209 See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (2010).

